Case #1: Putting the Con in Connecticut College

- Our fraudster, “KM”, oversaw student ID cards, print shop, bookstore, vending machines, transportation, laundry services, and residence halls
- KM submitted invoices from a fake company, then approved payment and had the College pay via Paypal.
- KM later decided to be more creative, so he created his own LLC and submitted fraudulent invoices. He approved payment and the College paid directly to his bank account.
- The documentation wasn’t clear on the business purpose to the College.
- KM also diverted checks that were intended to pay the college for royalties and van rentals and instead deposited in his own account.
- He then started diverting checks from a contractor that were intended to reimburse former students and, instead, deposited in his own account.

Article is available at https://www.theday.com/article/20181114/NWS04/181119700

Questions for group discussion:

- If you saw one of these transactions in UAccess Analytics or UAccess Financials, what additional questions would you have for KM?

- In a monthly review of accounts in UAccess Analytics, what might have looked unusual? Anything you would have reviewed further?

- If you had access to any type of data possible, what would you want to know?
Case #2: The Pilfering Postman

- Our fraudster, “ET”, oversaw six postal department employees, all university postal & shipping operations, postal equipment & supplies purchasing, and the budgets
- ET had a side business, ET Security, beginning in 1998, and he disclosed it in 2012
- Created Fictitious Vendor (FV #1), appearing to sell postal equipment & supplies in 2012
- Used his Purchasing Card to process the payments to FV #1 using ET Security’s merchant bank account to process them
- Made false invoices in the name of FV #1, and listed products never received
- PCard payments in the name of ET Security discovered by staff in 2013 & linked to FV #1
- When confronted, admitted he also caused the university to mail checks for a second fictitious vendor (FV #2), similar to FY #1, from 1998-2012
- ET switched to FV #1 in 2012 when the university began requiring a W-9 form for all vendors receiving checks


Questions for group discussion:

- If you saw one of these transactions in UAccess Analytics or UAccess Financials, what additional questions would you have for ET?

- In a monthly review of accounts in UAccess Analytics, what might have looked unusual? Anything you would have reviewed further?

- If you had access to any type of data possible, what would you want to know?